Two weeks of chained, stateful adversarial testing against a deployed model or assistant, delivered as a written report with a reproducible proof-of-concept for every finding and a harness you keep.
Two weeks at the published floor for the AI security practice. The floor covers up to 3 distinct systems, models or accounts; beyond that, each further block of up to 3 systems adds 10 percent, capped at 30 percent, and more than 12 systems needs a scoping call.
Two weeks buys the practice's shorter adversarial shapes, chosen at the scoping call: an LLM red team (the site scopes it at 2–4 weeks, adversarial) against a deployed model or assistant, or a RAG and retrieval review (2–3 weeks, targeted) against the retrieval path. We assess the deployment as one system — the prompt, the index, the tools and the cloud account underneath — because that is the surface an attacker actually gets.
Testing is chained and stateful rather than single-shot: prompt injection through every channel the system will accept text from, including filenames, retrieved documents and tool output; jailbreak chains, instruction-hierarchy collapse and refusal-boundary mapping under sustained pressure. In the retrieval shape that means tenant isolation in embedding stores, indirect injection via ingested documents, extraction of source material through reconstruction attacks, and access-control drift between the source system and the index that mirrors it. We report the path, not just the payload.